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Law and the Theory of Lack
The 2005 Rudolf B. Schlesinger Lecture






True, our system is wasteful, and fruitful of many small disputes.
True, a large estate can be managed more economically than a
small one. True, pasture farming yields higher profits than tillage.
Nevertheless, master steward, our wasteful husbandry feeds many
households where your economical methods would feed few. In
our ill-arranged fields and scrubby commons most families hold a
share, though it be but a few roods. In our unenclosed village there
are few rich, but there are few destitute, save when God sends a
bad harvest and we all starve together. We do not like your
improvements which ruin half the honest men affected by them.
- Imagined statement from a manor jury to an estate steward
With all that has been written about comparative law it is
remarkable how little notice has been taken of the cultural politics of
law. This is in part attributable to the assumption that families of
legal systems have developed in isolation from each other, and the
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belief that law is above politics. This omission of the politics of law is
significant, for law was and is commonly constructed to justify,
administer, and sanction conquest and plunder. While theoreticians
of Euro-American imperialism recognize the uses of law discourse
and practice that constitute keystones of the "civilizing process," the
dark side of the law is its imperial uses - historically and currently - a
cultural project that merits empirical attention.
A Euro-American configuration of institutions and belief
systems has normalized and powered a Euro-American use of "rule
of law" and lack, an ideology key to the colonial and imperial project
whether it was being exercised by the British, French, American,
Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, German, or Italian colonial interest in
pursuit of their enrichment. In the contemporary period, the
appropriation of resources and ideas belonging to other peoples are
sometimes justified by notions of civilization, development,
modernization, or alternative dispute resolution. Lack has been used
to highlight positional superiority, an important mechanism for
constructing and legitimizing conditions for plunder.
Rhetoric attendant to the rule of law or its lack has been used
throughout Euro-American expansions and with repetitive frequency
to camouflage the taking of land, water, minerals, and labor as
happened in countless locales to native peoples under colonialism.
An interesting question is why powerful nations or groups bother
with legitimating devices such as the "rule of law" when history
clearly shows that they can dispense with such legitimating devices.
Another interesting question is how the process of implementing an
uninvited law works. The claims of a developing nation against the
inherited rights of the First Native Americans was decided in the
United States by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1823. Accordingly,
the Indians of the United States did not possess an unqualified
sovereignty as independent nations. How is it that so many legal
scholars can so easily dispense with such acts as U.S. allotment
policies culmination in the Dawes Act of 1887? It's the how that
interests me in what follows.
When legal scholars or practicing lawyers speak publicly of law,
they commonly refer to the purposeful functions of the law - a
process for facilitating and protecting voluntary arrangements or as a
process for resolving acute social conflicts, or as process necessary for
orderly continuities. But Euro-American law cuts both ways. The
not-so-nice functions of the law are adumbrated in the research on
European colonialism, the work on legal orientalism, the work on law
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and development as legal imperialism, or the work on states of
exception as in the "War on Terror" in the foreign arena or the
curtailment of the Bill of Rights on the domestic front. Ideas such as
the promotion of the "rule of law" or its lack are key in American
discourse on foreign policy. In fact, what Woodrow Wilson
considered an obligation of the United States, the universal
dissemination of the "rule of law," has rarely been the object of
public discussion because its positive connotation has always been
taken for granted. Today, in the name of democracy and the rule of
law, the American public has been persuaded of the moral
acceptability of military aggression and occupation of a foreign
country, Iraq, utilizing among others George Kennan's "straight
power doctrine" to protect our extractive and ideological needs, and
once again utilizing ideas of lack to underscore positional superiority.
Thus, the European roots of the colonial project were tied to a
theory of lack - a theory that justified taking property from those
deemed lacking the ability to exploit resources around them. Other
peoples lacked law - a provider of order, beneficial to the public
good. Steeped in 19th century unilineal evolution - whereby human
society progressed from savagery, to barbarism, to civilization as
exemplified by Europe - Western countries identified themselves as
being civilized because they were governed by the rule of law, no
matter what the actual history of a present situation might be. Such
identity was acquired by knowledge of and false comparison with
other peoples, those who were said to lack the rule of law, such as
indigenous people, or in reference to China, Japan, India or the
Islamic world more generally. In addition, today the Third World
developing countries lack further, the minimal institutional system
necessary for the unfolding of an efficient market, one that serves,
today as in the past, to further the construction of Western
superiority. Of course, the Other is often aware that "lack" is about
the building of a universal rule of law that, while ethnocentric, is
capable of facilitating efficient transfers of property rights from
whoever values them less to whoever values them more, such that
global rule makers claim sovereignty over local politics.
II. The Beginning
Property rights long engaged philosophers and perhaps most
famously John Locke whose justification for entitlements through
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improvements led to alterations in law and administrative practices.
When Swiss philosopher and statesman Emrich de Vattel published
his book The Law of Nations in 1758, he had a ready audience
amongst the colonizing nations of Europe then located in North
America. His arguments about land were congenial to the colonizing
nations of the 18th century because he gave legal justification for the
colonial appropriations of lands, thereby lending moral authority to
what First North American Peoples might describe as theft. In his
words:
The earth belongs to all mankind ... All mean have a natural right
to inhabit it... All men have an equal right to things which have
not yet come into the possession of anyone. When, therefore a
Nation finds a country uninhabited and without an owner, it may
lawfully take possession of it. In connection with the discovery of
the New World, it is asked whether a Nation may lawfully occupy
any part of a vast territory in which are to be found only wandering
tribes whose small number cannot populate the whole country...
we are not departing from the intentions of nature when we restrict
savages within narrower bounds. (quoted in Williams 1986: 127-29)
These were sweet words and not the only such words written to
justify the legal taking of land in the New World. Terra Nullius -
vacant land - an untouched wilderness; the fact that most of the land
was occupied by indigenous nations was brushed aside since as
"pagan and uncivilized people" Native Americans lacked: they were
not capable of holding territorial title, property rights, or jurisdiction
over their land. So when the British Crown assumed sovereignty over
all American territory they asserted full title and complete
jurisdiction as if it were a vacant country. Although the British
Crown made a practice of entering into treaties with some Indian
groups for purposes of "purchasing" lands, such did not involve
recognition of their land rights. The doctrine of legal vacuum was
popular even though not unchallenged, or at least rethought - a more
sophisticated version of the doctrine of legal vacuum appeared later
when Chief Justice Marshall elaborated the principle of discovery -
recognizing the relations between the discoverer and the natives, then
moving late on and finally to the rights of conquest.
It is important to note that the imperial side of American law was
present long before neo-liberalism. It was present before the
American Revolution of 1776. It was already present in doctrinal
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thinking when British colonists arrived in North America and
encountered Native American communities, Inherent in the
philosophy of John Locke's 1689 Treatises of Government was the
idea that Native American properties could be appropriated by
command of the Christian god - "As much land as a Man Tills,
Plants, Improves, Cultivates and can use..."
Il. Law and Development
Law and Development is but a continuation of the "need" for
progress and the "need" to improve others who lacked something we
could provide. American legal assistance to the Third World was
crafted by American lawyers and supported by both private
foundations and government developed assistance programs. Legal
missionaries, as James Gardner called them, were sent to Asia and
Africa in the 1950s and to Latin America in the 1960s. The purpose,
according to many writers, was to include lawyerly aid in the foreign
aid process, to encourage development along capitalist and liberal
democratic lines as opposed to possible communist penetration in
these areas. The rule of law would facilitate democratic reforms and
economic development and nation building. And, of course, there
were human rights that needed to be protected. What they lacked we
could provide - legal engineers and a vision of law as an instrument of
development policies. And, of course, this meant the transfer of
American models of what it means to educate an American lawyer
and what purposes law might serve. There was little doubt that
American legal models would benefit Latin America and the Third
World more generally. It would bring democracy to authoritarian
states. There was optimism and excitement among these legal
missionaries even though they often could not speak the language nor
did they carry any knowledge of the peoples and places to which they
were sent.
The critique provided by James Gardner's Legal Imperialism
book cut to the core - American legal assistance was a product of
hubris. More importantly, the movement did not carry abroad the
most enduring and basic instruments of American law: the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights. Instead, there were legal transfer
mechanisms - visiting American law professors, fellowships for study
in the U.S., conferences on law and development, legal assistance
grants and institutional supports between American and foreign law
2005]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
schools. Receptivity was found among lawyers anxious to modernize
antiquated systems, to rid themselves of formalistic traditions, those
more pragmatic, people training to be "legal engineers" of
development and the "technicians of democracy." The consequences
were frequently unanticipated - some recipients were technicians of
regressive change, and Gardner notes some were technicians of
repressive change, apologists for one or another military dictatorship.
Put in its simplest form, Gardner notes that those all too ready to
embrace American legal models served to diminish the legal
profession as a source of opposition to state policies. What started
out as a desire to help the little people changed and the "legal
missionaries" returned home to begin a new field of inquiry, one that
required them to look in the mirror, at the flaws in the models they
were taking abroad - an interest that was reflected in new movements
here - legal services for the poor, public interest law, and law reform.
In the end legal missionaries concluded that it was we who lacked.
But they were few in number, and outnumbered by powerful
institutions whose hubris was even greater and continuous.
There had been public pronouncements by various presidents of
the ABA. I will only quote one so that you have a flavor of deeply
held ideas that continue to this day:
A new and magnificent duty now rests with the legal profession...
it is the especial duty of lawyers to establish and maintain lawful
order for the world, because they are the ministers of law ...
Because of the strength and position of America, we, the lawyers of
America, face an opportunity to take a decisive part in reshaping
the future of the world. (Robert Wilkin, 1961)
American legal structures and ideas were neither invited to their
law and development schemes abroad nor did they have the power to
impose the law in the usual sense, and thus American law could not
be exported directly. Indirect and infused export meant introducing
paradigms and values of legal education models, "rule of law" and
"case law" jurisprudence, and the idea of legal engineers as architects
of a free society. For the legal missionaries law was a "nicely adjusted
piece of legal machinery." Others disagreed and thought that law was
inseparable from its origin, not "socially easy." And also there was
competition with French and English exports. But whether it be
European or American the hubris was there. Latin American legal
education was thought to be defective; Africa was thought not to have
[Vol. 28:2
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law since customary law was not really law. They lacked ... what we
had, and what we have they should also have.
A. The Chinese Lack Law
The same paradigm of lack is also applied to the other extant
civilizations. Even today, we hear repeatedly that China lacked and
lacks law, or was and is averse to law. Such statements are often
accompanied by arguments as to the difficulty of bringing the rule of
law to China. One American lawyer unself-consciously states that
"Basically the ban must be invented as a profession without
anyguidance from Chinese tradition, or China's recent history."
(Lubman 200: 158) Beyond lacking law, the Chinese are now charged
with ignoring the law they had! Erasure had become part of the
policy. What has buttressed the hegemonic scope of law is now an
internal cultural logic based on lack or emptiness, a logic that has had
lasting power over centuries of Euro-American dominance, even
though perceptions of what they lack may change. In the context of
the rise of law and economics strategies, this lack theory has today
been fully rationalized as a lack of efficiency.
Legal ethnocentrism has recently been classed as a form of Legal
Orientalism. In one article that appeared in the Michigan Law
Review (Ruskola, Oct. 2002) we can see why. The author observes
that
. . . by considering Legal Orientalism as an ongoing cultural
tradition we can understand better why, even today, claims about
the status of Chinese law are so relentlessly normative ... because
... they support an overly idealized self-image of the American
legal subject and an unduly negative view of the Chinese (non)legal
(non)subject. Chinese are ruled by morality, American by law,
Chinese are lemmings, Americans individuals, Chinese are
despotic, Americans democratic; China is changeless, America
dynamic...
Ruskola wishes to challenge the historic claim made by many
Western observers that China lacks an indigenous tradition of "law,"
while doing more to understand how the West "has come to
understand itself through law." After all China boasts dynastic legal
codes going back to the Tang dynasty. Yet, Western scholars have
2005]
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constructed their cultural legal identity against China, and despite
vigorcus efforts to debunk the view of China as lacking in law, we still
have scholars such as Thomas Stephens (1992) arguing that Chinese
law is not even worthy of the phrase "jurisprudence." The task,
Ruskola argues, may be to "provincialize Europe" and by doing so
renew European traditions "from and for the margins."
B. Islam Lacks Rational Law
Legal Orientalism has been receiving a good deal of attention of
late, especially with the American invasion of Iraq. Jedidiah
Kroncke's article on "The Flexible Orientalism of Islamic Law"
(2005) beings with a quote from John Strawson's Islamic Law and
English Texts: "English texts do not merely present Islamic law, they
construct it" (1995). Not far into his paper Kroncke has a section
titled "Weber's Taxonomy and Islamic Law." He begins not by
quoting Max Weber but Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter,
who had habitually read Weber (the father of Legal Orientalism):
"(the Supreme Court) is not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do
not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency."
Kroncke, who is studying Chinese law, summarizes ideas of Max
Weber as published in his book Economy and Society in order to
understand why Weberian legal orientalism remains entrenched, in
spite of empirical research to the contrary. Weber focuses on several
historical legal traditions, including Islam. Weber uses the term
"kadi" to describe a system of justice which is not focused on a
formally rational law, but on the ethical, religious postulates of a
substantively legal systems with two dimensions: formal/substantive
and rational/irrational thereby generating four categories. For
Weber, Western continental law fits into the ideal type of "formal
rationality." In contrast, Islamic law was one of substantive
rationality concerned with the implications of Islam's religious norms:
"The dominance of law that has been stereotyped by religion
constitutes one of the most significant limitations to the
rationalization of the legal order" (1968: 657). Weber defines the
groundwork of subsequent Legal Orientalism in making the
distinction between the substantive rationality of Islamic law and its
substantively irrational administration of justice. As he puts it, "a
typical feature of the patrimonial state ... is the juxtaposition of
traditional prescription and arbitrary decision-making, the latter
[Vol. 28:2
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serving as a substitute for a regime of rational rules" (ibid: 1041).
Weber rejects the possibility of an Islamic jurisprudence. Kadi
opinions may be authoritative, but they vary from person to person,
and are given without any statement of rational reasons. While
Weber's analysis has been called into question by a number of
scholars that is Kroncke's point, nor mine. We are concerned with
the relatively undisturbed aspect of Weber's characterization of
Islamic law. People like Bryan Turner (1978) continue the stereotype
with essentialized comments such as "Islamic law provided society
with a tight, normative structure which.. . cannot change rationally to
meet new contingencies." Wolfgang Schluchter (1999) writes that
Islamic "legal development was paralyzed." Patricia Crone (1999)
reiterates the "impossibility of Islamic law as an effective legal system
because of its substantive grounding." The work of critics Moosa
(1988) and Hanif (1999) does not make a dent in Weber's pejorative
representation of Islamic law.
Kroncke moves to examine the major work on Islamic law by the
influential scholar Joseph Schacht (1950) and by American
anthropologist Lawrence Rosen (1984) (2000). For Schacht (1950)
(1964), Islamic legal theory is rote and mechanical, Islam is "only
arbitrary opinion." . . . "a formidable obstacle to every innovation,
and in order to discredit anything it was, and still is, enough to call it
an innovation (1950: 129), a "jurist's law," concerned with its own
internal logic and nothing with social reality, and suffering from an
inherent rigidity ... disinterested in any notion of justice, the "letter
rather than the spirit of the law" (ibid: 72), a concern with
appearances. Irrationality and unreality are the common themes.
While there may be a growing mistrust of Schacht's assumptions (see
Haim Gerber's Islamic Law and Culture), the continuing stereotyping
of Islamic law gives full expression to the negative implications of
Weber's work for representing "the anarchy of the Arab way of life"
(1964: 23), a position that feeds into 21st century global politics.
When Kroncke (2005) examines the work of Lawrence Rosen
things don't get better, even though Rosen is an anthropologist.
Rosen revives Weber's characterization of the capricious kadi thereby
reaffirming the basic structure of Islamic legal orientalism. In his
books, The Anthropology of Justice (1989) and The Justice of Islam
(2000), Rosen uses the concept of totalizing subjectivity as well as the
metaphor of the bazaar to describe an essentialized Muslim society, a
world of premonitory chaos, one in which Arabs lack an appreciation
for regularity and tangibility of space and time. In his neo-Weberian
2005]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
view of kadi justice, Rosen explains that part of the trauma of
colonialism for Muslims was the fact that European powers tried to
introduce specific legal codes, troubling in a world where truth and
veracity are not motivating concerns!
Kroncke concludes:
Rosen and Schacht both exhibit the same inability to make
reference to Western law in anything but the most idealized
representations. Western law becomes the evaluative standard and
both are oblivious to peoples who have been radically impacted by
colonialism, all of which plays into the hands if those uncritical
thinkers planning U.S. foreign policy in these Eastern lands, people
who only hear irrationality, illegitimate, unchanging, immorality.
The legacy of colonialism continues and expands to include those
who self-colonize thereby affirming Weber's caricatures and
uncritical idealizations of Westernization and law or even to
idealizations of Islamic law.
Idealizations have been of concern for as long as there has been
anthropological fieldwork resulting in ethnographies, or because of
the use of idealizations as a form of hegemony or even counter-
hegemonies (Nader and Ou, 1998). With regard to the study of law
anthropologists are not the only professionals who worry about
idealizations as an impediment to understanding how law works,
indeed what law is. The concern of legal scholars can be found in
earlier work by Judith Shklar (1964), who observes the tendency
among legal scholars who are caught by "the ideal purposes of law to
govern one's thinking about law in general. It means thinking of law
only as it ought to be - as legalism wants it to be, not as it actually is"
(Shklar, 1964: 31). For Shklar, this means a legal system that meets
the formal qualifications of being "self-regulating, immune from the
unpredictable pressures of politicians and moralists, manned by a
judiciary that at least tries to maintain justice's celebrated blindness"
(Shklar, 1964: 31). We are all limited by the belief systems and
thought structures if our own cultures and disciplinary paradigms.
And different versions of this problematic of an internalist
perspective dominating the investigatory capacities and theorists of
law appear in the work of legal theorists such as H.L. Hart, but not
apparently in the work of Max Weber and his heirs. Needles to say,
nowhere are such issues more salient than under colonial or
imperialist conditions as in present-day Iraq where such legal
[Vol. 28:2
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ideologies are normalized.
IV. Iraq - Direct Imposition of Law, Uninvited
An illustration of the continuities of imperialism and a powerful
example is the case of Iraq during the contemporary occupation by
American and British forces. A non-elected L. Paul Bremer III and
the Committee of the Iraqi Governing Council passed edicts, closed
newspapers under the "rule of law," ordered curfews, and wrote and
spoke about what one journalist called Phantom Sovereignty. Paul
Bremer used military force to back these moves and more
importantly, a military force that allowed the total disorganization of
competing legal controls in Iraq, customary, Islamic, and state.
According to the U.S. press, the first months of occupation of
Iraq were about bringing the rule of law to Iraq as part of democracy
promotion measures. There were eye-catching headlines in U.S.
newspapers and magazines. A few excerpts give a flavor of how
systems targeted as lacking work for the more powerful.
San Francisco Chronicle, 4-11-03, "Iraq's Judicial System Lacks
Practitioners, Scholars Say," by Reynolds Holding
The article reports that Iraq's current legal system derives from
the nation's 1924 constitution, which credited a parliamentary
monarchy similar to the one that rules Jordan and contained certain
basic guarantees of human rights indicative of an influence from
France's Napoleonic Code. The article also notes that in the 1960s,
Iraq adopted a new set of codes; a 1968 Baath Party established a
council that circumvented existing laws, by means of courts, their
version of the Patriot Act, allowing people to be tortured or killed.
The trick today, the experts argue, is to strip the system of all the laws
and special courts established by the revolutionary command council.
Legal specialists suggest taking the existing system, and using what
there is in a more modern context. Such a policy means not changing
the substantive law, but changing the procedures to ensure that they
are fair and efficient. William Alford's observations bear repeating
(2003: 74): we "approach legal reform in other societies as if the past
were little more than an incumberance, that the clear-minded should
be only too ready to discard for a future remarkably akin to ours."
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Wall Street Journal, 4-19-03, "Team to Rebuild Iraq's Courts
Includes Three federal Judges" . . .members of the team, which
includes federal prosecutors, public defenders, court
administrators, and a state judge have signed on... to assess the
condition of Iraq's judicial system ... 13 member... to develop an
independent judiciary so that Iraqi people will have confidence in
their courts." . . ."Legal experts say Iraq had been developing a
sophisticated justice system prior to 1968 when the Baath Party
took power. Khaled Abou El Fadl warned they are not writing on a
clean slate ... (watch) mucking around with the tribal courts and
customary law."
New York Times, 5-11-03, "American Will Advise Iraqis on Writing
New Constitution," by Jennifer Lee. "Noah Feldman... will try to
blend American ideas of democracy with Islamic traditions."
"Looking for common ground between Islam and American
democracy."
What Western ideals? Whose model of democracy? Why
democracy? In whose interests? The experience of trying to shape
others, as we can see, inevitably shapes us as well (Nader 2003).
Early on after the invasion of Iraq, the distinguished Islamic
scholar, Khaled Abou El Fadl, a law professor at UCLA, wrote an
opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal titled "Rebuilding the Law."
In this piece Abou El Fadl maintains that Iraq had a rich and long
jurisprudential tradition long before Saddam Hussein came to power.
He noted that after gaining independence from Britain in 1930, Iraq,
like most Arab countries, adopted Civil and Criminal Law Codes
from the French and Germanic legal systems. Iraq's personal law,
however, continued to be based primary on Islamic law.
The Iraqi Civil Code of 1953 was one of the most innovative and
meticulously systematic codes of the Middle East. Iraqi jurists,
working with the assistance of the famous Egyptian jurist Abd Al-
Razzaq Al-Sanhuri, drafted a code that balanced and merged
elements of Islamic and French law in one of the most successful
attempts to preserve the best of both legal systems. In 1959 Iraq
promulgated the Code of Personal Status, which on issues of family
and testamentary law was at the time the most progress Muslim
code of law. Importantly, for our purposes now, this code merged
elements of Sunni and Shiite law to grant women greater rights in
[Vol. 28:2
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marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
According to Abou El Fadl when the Baath Party came to power
in 1968, Saddam involved Iraq in a series of wars that enabled him to
declare a constant state of national emergency and to rule mostly by
executive order. Iraq became one of the few countries that legally
sanctioned the use of torture in pre-trial investigations, as a punitive
measure, and the death sentence was prescribed for a large variety of
offenses. Law became contingent on the will of the party and the
president. After the Gulf War of 1991 Saddam announced that he
would implement Islamic law in Iraq, a theatrical move the point of
which was public spectacle. Abou El Fadl concludes his opinion piece
by recommending that: "American policy makers must understand
that Iraq's legal and ethical history did not start with the overthrow of
Saddam." (WSJ, April 21, 2003). They do not lack.
The 100 Orders enacted by Paul Bremer who was head of the
now defunct Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were apparently
meant to fill a lack - the minimal reform necessary for the unfolding
of an efficient neoliberal market. Thus, Bremer's Orders give
preference to U.S. corporations over the development of Iraqi
economy intended to change Iraq from a centrally planned economy
to a market economy, and Order #39 does not shrink from openly
asserting such a goal, allowing for the privatization of Iraq's 200 state-
owned enterprises. Order #40 changes the banking sector from a
state-run system to a market-driven system. And Order #81 prohibits
Iraqis from saving seeds; they only plant seed for their food from
licensed, authorized U.S. distributors. And one Iraqi is quoted as
saying, "the day will come, sooner rather than later, when the Iraqis
will shred Bremer's law, soak them in water and offer them to Bremer
to drink."
A. A Time for a New Paradigm
I recently heard a Zapatista speaking on a radio program. His
words resonate: "Our crime is in being who we are; in being different,
not what power wants us to be. We wish for a world where many
worlds exist."
And there have been times when many worlds existed, amidst
lively trade and contact. In her book Before European Hegemony
(1989), Janet Abou-Lughod described the world system of the 13th
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century, a time in which a wide variety of culture systems co-existed.
Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam - all seem to have
permitted and facilitated lively commerce, production, and exchange.
Nor were underlying bases for economic activities uniform. Weber
was wrong about Eastern cultures providing inhospitable
environment for merchant accumulators and industrial developers.
What they lacked were free resources as that flow from the Americas
to Europe. A restructuring of the Eurocentric modern world system
might provide a new energy, new creativities, and inspire a rule of law
with a humanitarian impulse.
